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Abstract
This entry defines the concepts of information credibility and cognitive authority, introduces the key terms
and dimensions of each, and discusses major theoretical frameworks tested and proposed in library and
information science (LIS) and related fields. It also lays out the fundamental notions of credibility and
cognitive authority in historical contexts to trace the evolution of the understanding and enhancement of
the two concepts. This entry contends that the assessment of information credibility and cognitive
authority is a ubiquitous human activity given that people constantly make decisions and selections based
on values of information in a variety of information seeking and use contexts. It further contends that
information credibility and cognitive authority assessment can be seen as an ongoing and iterative process
rather than a discrete information evaluation event. The judgments made in assessment processes are
highly subjective given their dependence on individuals’ accumulated beliefs, existing knowledge, and
prior experiences. The conclusion of this entry suggests the need for more research by emphasizing the
contributions that credibility and cognitive authority research can make to the field of LIS.
INTRODUCTION
This entry traces the evolution of the concepts of credibility
and cognitive authority in library and information science
(LIS) and other related fields including communication,
human-computer interaction, and psychology. It provides
definitions for information credibility and cognitive author-
ity. It also introduces multiple dimensions as well as theo-
retical frameworks explaining the process of assessing
credibility and cognitive authority, concluding by discuss-
ing the significance of the two concepts and calling for
further research in the area.
Historically, credibility and cognitive authority of infor-
mation were considered as criteria for making relevance
judgments in LIS. Due to the recent growth of the Internet
and concomitant evolution of information, communication,
and publishing mechanisms, LIS researchers and practi-
tioners have increasingly recognized the importance of un-
derstanding credibility and cognitive authority as a research
agenda in its own right. Today people have access to a
wider range of information resources than ever before, and
as a result, face greater challenges in evaluating the useful-
ness of information with which they interact. Given the
popularity of various self-published resources in which the
source of information is vague and uncertain, the assess-
ment of information credibility and cognitive authority has
become a ubiquitous human activity.
In this entry, credibility and cognitive authority are con-
sidered as closely related yet different concepts. Most
definitions of credibility revolve around the concept of bel-
ievability of information.[1] This entry uses the term cogni-
tive authority, coined by Patrick Wilson to differentiate it
from administrative authority.[2] Unlike a person in admin-
istrative authority, the world’s leading authority in a domain
area has no power to command. Experts perceived as not
only credible or worthy of belief but also influential in other
people’s thinking are termed cognitive authorities. Those
people or information sources considered to be credible
serve as the potential pool of cognitive authorities. That is,
cognitive authority is one of the principal aspects of infor-
mation credibility.
CREDIBILITY DEFINITIONS AND ORIGINS
Definitions
Credibility is an intuitive and complex concept.[3] Rather
than having one clear definition, credibility has been de-
fined along with dozens of other related concepts such as
believability, trustworthiness, fairness, accuracy, trustful-
ness, factuality, completeness, precision, freedom from
bias, objectivity, depth, and informativeness. Most credibil-
ity researchers agree that credibility assessment results from
simultaneously evaluating multiple dimensions. Among
these, two key dimensions are identified: trustworthiness
and expertise.[4] Trustworthiness is a core dimension in
credibility assessment that captures the perceived goodness
and morality of the source.[5] The perception that a source
is fair, unbiased, and truthful contributes to the trustworthi-
ness of information. Trustworthiness is, however, not a
synonym for credibility because people also must recognize
expertise in order to deem information credible. Expertise
reflects perceived knowledge, skill, and experience of the
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source.[5] Expertise is likewise an important factor given its
close relationship to people’s perceptions of a source’s abil-
ity to provide information that is both accurate and valid.
Trustworthiness and expertise are not always perceived
together. An expert with the title of doctor or professor
might have a reputation of being knowledgeable in a
certain area but still might not be considered trustworthy
for the tendency to unreliability or bias. A person may
think of a friend as being honest and trustworthy in gen-
eral, but the advice that the friend gives is not necessarily
considered credible for the friend’s lack of expertise. The
most credible information is found in those perceived to
have high levels of trustworthiness and expertise.
Credibility does not reside in an information object,
source, or person, although the characteristics of the forego-
ing can serve as the bases for people’s assessment. It is
people who ultimately make judgments of information
credibility. People who have their own experience, knowl-
edge, and beliefs are likely to make their own credibility
judgments. Many studies show, in fact, that judgments of
credibility are highly subjective assessment processes. In
this entry, credibility is defined as people’s assessment of
whether information is trustworthy based on their own ex-
pertise and knowledge.
Historical Development
The fields of communication and LIS are both concerned
with the credibility assessment of information and sources.
Credibility research, however, has evolved in fundamen-
tally different ways, with each field having its own origins,
approaches, and goals for the study of credibility over the
past five decades. Some researchers believe that scholarly
interest in credibility dates back to Aristotle’s examination
of ethos (appeal based on character), pathos (appeal based
on emotion), and logos (appeal based on logic or reason).[6]
Aristotle’s notion of credibility focused mainly on the
characteristics of ethos, which is “the communicator’s
ability to inspire confidence and belief in what was being
said” (pp. 422–423).[3]
Scholarly examination of credibility began in the twen-
tieth century when psychologists investigated persuasion
as a part of the propaganda efforts during the World Wars.
A series of landmark studies were conducted by the Yale
Group which defined credibility as a receiver-based con-
struct and suggested that credibility is determined by an
audience’s acceptance of a speaker.[4] In the 1950s, mass
media professionals took an interest in the notion of credi-
bility when television became popular and subscription
rates for newspapers began to decline. Professional news
organizations’ examination of perceived credibility of
newspapers versus television then grew into the study of
media credibility which to this day remains an established
research area in the field of communication.
Credibility research began much more recently in LIS
as compared to the communication field. This does not
mean that LIS researchers and practitioners had no con-
cerns about credibility assessment in the past. Rather, LIS
research into human judgments of information centered
on the notion of relevance. Relevance is often seen as
playing a significant, underlying, and yet elusive role for
various information activities such as acquiring, organiz-
ing, storing, preserving, searching, communicating, inter-
acting with, and using information.[7] The history of
relevance started with the first libraries as library users
were concerned about the problem of finding information
relevant to them.[7] However, the notion of relevance
remained hidden and implicit until Vickery’s presentations
at the 1958 International Conference on Scientific Informa-
tion.[8] Since then, relevance has been studied extensively
in terms of frameworks for defining relevance dimensions,
forms of document representation affecting relevance judg-
ment, subjectivity of relevance judgment, and identification
of criteria adopted by users in judging relevance.
While the majority of relevance research has discussed
relevance in terms of its topical aspect, which concerns itself
with whether or not the topic of a search query matches the
topic of a document, alternative notions have been sug-
gested. For instance, utility, which is entirely subjective and
based on personal judgment, is proposed as a measure of
information retrieval effectiveness.[9] Relevance and utility
are not the same concepts. Until the 1980s, relevance was
viewed as judgments concerned with aboutness, pertinence,
or topical-relatedness. Utility was considered a broad con-
cept involving not only topic-relatedness but also quality,
novelty, importance, credibility, and other evaluations. In
the 1990s, a substantial body of empirical studies on rele-
vance criteria was conducted, producing studies which con-
sistently revealed that people use much more diverse criteria
than mere topicality in making relevance judgments. The
criteria identified in these user-centered relevance studies
include credibility, authority, completeness, depth, currency,
accuracy, quality, effectiveness, belief, and clarity.[10]
In LIS, as in other related fields, the emergence and
proliferation of information technology, the Internet in
particular, provided the impetus for improved and more
formal understanding of the notion of credibility. Empiri-
cal studies showed that people became more concerned
about quality, credibility, and authority of information as
they gain awareness of the fact that the Web lacks quality
control mechanisms in contrast to traditional information
retrieval systems.[11] Further, when looking for informa-
tion, people rely on multiple information resources and
may even seek to verify across different resources given
the availability and accessibility of various types of digi-
tal media and forms of information.[12] The two fields—
LIS and communication—that have studied credibility
from different perspectives and presumptions because of
historical origins have drawn closer together than ever
before as both fields have paid more attention to the
significance of studying credibility and authority assess-
ment in the contemporary digital information landscape.





























































Communication researchers have traditionally drawn dis-
tinctions between source credibility, message credibility,
and media credibility. Source credibility usually refers to
“judgments made by a perceiver concerning the believ-
ability of a communicator” (pp. 130–131).[13] Numerous
empirical studies have investigated the dimensions of
source credibility from the perspectives of message reci-
pients and identified those factors that might influence
audience perceptions of trustworthiness and expertise.
These factors include dynamism, composure, sociability,
qualification, reliability, animation, poise, and good-
naturedness.[14] A meta-analysis of 114 credibility studies
revealed that source expertise is a stronger influence on
persuasion than other source characteristics given that the
expertise dimension of source credibility is more objec-
tive than other dimensions and consequently easier to
assess.[15]
Message credibility examines how message character-
istics such as content, structure, language, and presenta-
tion can impact perceptions of the believability of
information. But the distinction between message credi-
bility and source credibility is not always clear. Credible
sources are likely to produce credible messages, and credi-
ble messages are likely to be seen as originating from
credible sources. When people have strong interest and
involvement, message characteristics become more influen-
tial than source characteristics because they are motivated
to scrutinize message content. In some situations in which
little information is available about the source of a message,
people tend to turn to message cues in making credibility
judgments.[16] Researchers have examined the influence of
various factors such as message comprehensibility, number
of arguments, incentives, fear appeals, one-sided versus
two-sided messages, repetition, and presentation style on
people’s message credibility assessments.[14]
Media credibility focuses on the relative credibility of
various media channels through which a message is sent.
Media credibility studies typically ask which medium
people would believe if they received conflicting reports
on the same news story from different media such as
radio, television, magazines, and newspapers.[17] This
question aimed to discover people’s perceptions of the
relative credibility of different news media. Previous
studies suggest that media credibility is strongly related
to the frequency with which people use a particular me-
dium. In them, people judge their preferred medium as
being the most credible.
In recent years, media credibility studies have attempted
to compare people’s perceptions of traditionally-delivered
information sources (newspapers, magazines, brochures,
etc.) and their online counterparts (online newspapers,
online news magazines, online political Web sites, etc.).
The popularity and unique characteristics of the Web as
a medium led to studying Web credibility as a distinct
notion. Credibility researchers have proceeded to note
the following characteristics of the Web: lack of filtering
mechanisms, form inclusive of interaction techniques and
interface attributes, source ambiguity, and infancy as a
medium.[18]
Computer credibility impacts the field of human-
computer interaction (HCI) when computers act as knowl-
edge repositories, instruct users, report measures, report on
work performance, report on their own state, run simula-
tions, and help in the rendering of virtual environments.
Computer credibility assessment relies on simultaneous
evaluation of four types of credibility: presumed credibil-
ity, reputed credibility, surface credibility, and experienced
credibility.[1] Presumed credibility refers to the extent to
which people believe information because of general
assumptions in their mind. Sometimes people make
assumptions based on stereotypes rather than on truth, and
these assumptions and stereotypes all contribute to credi-
bility perceptions. Reputed credibility describes the extent
to which people believe information because of what
third parties—other people, media, or institutions—have
reported. These reports may come in the form of endorse-
ments, awards, or referrals. Surface credibility derives
from simple inspection. People make credibility judgments
based on first impressions of surface traits such as of book
covers, the visual designs of software, interface designs,
and the information architecture of Web sites. Experienced
credibility refers to the extent to which people believe
information based on their first-hand experience. It may
prove to be the most powerful form of credibility because
it derives from people’s interaction with others or with
systems over an extended period of time.
Some credibility researchers who consider the pro-
cesses of social endorsement to be crucial in credibility
construction have proposed several variants of credibility
including conferred credibility, tabulated credibility, and
emergent credibility.[6] Conferred credibility indicates
that people sometimes recognize credibility not based on
a real source of information but on other sources’ posi-
tive reputation, all of which helps alleviate skepticism.
For instance, Google might confer its credibility on spon-
sored links in the search results page because most peo-
ple are unaware of the sponsorship model and consider
such links equivalent to Google’s results. Tabulated
credibility refers to the assessments people make based
on peer ratings of an individual, organization, or product.
The availability of aggregated ratings from other people
may widen the range of social input on which people
can rely in judging credibility. Emergent credibility
arises from a pool of resources, such as Wikipedia, wikis,
social networking sites, and other applications created
by individuals. These forms of credibility suggest that
people are not isolated evaluators of credibility as well
as that social engagements and interactions must be
considered in understanding credibility construction and
assessment.




































































Authority has been defined and discussed in many differ-
ent forms across numerous disciplines, including philoso-
phy, education, psychology, political science, law, religion,
and LIS. Authority is related to those areas of competence
or applicability over which it is exercised. Having author-
ity is different from being an expert because authority is a
relationship involving at least two people. A person can be
an expert even though others may not realize or recognize
the fact. No individual by himself or herself can be an auth-
ority. All authority is “a relation among a bearer, a subject, a
field, in virtue of a particular quality, attribute, and context”
[19, p. 77]. In other words, authority is limited to spheres.
A person can speak with authority within one sphere, but
with no authority on questions outside that sphere.
Many researchers agree on the two broad categories of
authority: epistemic authority and deontic authority. The
former corresponds to being an authority and the latter to
being in authority.[19] As an example of epistemic author-
ity, when people say, “He is an authority on Hegel,” they
mean that he is superior to others within a field in light
of knowledge about Hegel. Deontic authority takes the
forms of imperial authority as exercised by a state through
its government and its various organs, paternalistic auth-
ority as exercised by parents over their children, and
operative authority as vested in any designated leader or
office. In place of epistemic authority and deontic author-
ity, cognitive authority and administrative authority can
be used as alternative terms in distinguishing more clearly
these two different types of authority.[2]
COGNITIVE AUTHORITY
Definitions
Cognitive authority is a kind of influence.[2] Those who
are cognitive authorities profoundly influence others’
thoughts. People who are not cognitive authorities may
still exert an influence in the world. What distinguishes
people who are cognitive authorities from those who are
not is that the formers’ influence is recognized in some
official manner. Cognitive authority is a matter of degree;
thus the weight that a cognitive authority’s words carry
for others might vary. Even though it is possible for an
absolute cognitive authority in a given sphere to have an
answer to virtually all of the questions within the area,
people in general tend to take the opinions and advice of
others with different degrees of seriousness. Cognitive
authorities are those people whose opinions and advice
are taken more seriously with more weight being placed
on their words than on the words of others.[2]
Two bases for cognitive authority need to be recog-
nized: being an expert and being reputable.[2] To qualify
as an expert, a person should show evidence of knowledge,
skill, experience, training, and education. Because knowl-
edge and skill are difficult to test directly, evidence in
terms of occupational roles or advanced degrees often
must provide support for claims to expert status. How-
ever, not all experts necessarily possess outstanding com-
petence. Experience and education may provide evidence
of basic qualifications but still be insufficient in providing
a high degree of expertise. To be an outstanding expert, a
person must have a reputation for that expertise. In addi-
tion, established cognitive authorities can transfer author-
ity to other people. When reputation among peers is
unknown, special groups of people already considered to
be knowledgeable can be turned to. For instance, individ-
ual A believes individual B because individual A believes
group C, and group C says that individual B can be be-
lieved. This rule—that one can trust those who are trusted
by those one trusts[2]—constitutes a central feature of
cognitive authority.
Bases for Assessing Cognitive Authority
When people acquire influence from cognitive authorities,
there should be an answer for the question “What makes
you think so?” Whatever the reasons for thinking that
certain others deserve cognitive authority, it is not for the
reason that people always directly test the authorities’
knowledge. Rather, people often cite indirect tests that
serve as the bases of cognitive authority judgments. Not
only individuals are recognized as cognitive authorities:
books, journals, newspapers, manuscripts, and films are
all possible sources of knowledge and opinion though
they give rise to the same kind of questions about cogni-
tive authority: which works can be taken seriously?; how
much weight can be given to what the texts say? When
people have sufficient knowledge of certain topics, they
can claim directly against what they already know. How-
ever, most texts discuss topics people do not know enough
about to apply the direct test. This is because people look
for information and consult texts to find what they do not
know.[20] Therefore, people apply various indirect tests for
recognizing the cognitive authority of a text, including
personal authority, institutional authority, textual type auth-
ority, and intrinsic plausibility.[2]
The first apparent basis for recognizing a text’s cogni-
tive authority is the cognitive authority of its author. Peo-
ple will trust a text written by an individual or group of
individuals whom they trust. The tests of personal cogni-
tive authority are based on present reputation and accom-
plishments. Recognition of personal authority does not
automatically transfer to past or future work. An estab-
lished reputation is insufficient to establish the current
authority of old texts.
Another kind of test is associated with the publisher
and publication history. A publishing house can acquire a
kind of cognitive authority if it is considered to be good
at publishing high-quality work. Thus, publications by a




























































publishing house people respect constitute a kind of per-
sonal recommendation. A journal can exert authority, too,
which transfers to the articles it publishes. Other institu-
tional endorsements are also used as tests of authority. For
instance, sponsorship by a learned society or a profes-
sional organization serve as the basis of institutional au-
thority, as could publication by a government agency.
Then again, published reviews furnish a special indirect
test. If a reviewer has cognitive authority then his or her
review itself constitutes a personal recommendation.
The third kind of test, that of text type, is based on the
text itself separate from its author or publisher. For in-
stance, reference works such as dictionaries and encyclo-
pedias do not draw attention to their compilers as people
often do not know who the authors or editors are. Stan-
dard reference works tend to be revised frequently and
may be considered as institutions in their own right.
Finally, the test of intrinsic plausibility is always avail-
able. Reading a few words or sentences of the text may be
sufficient for people to decide whether or not to continue
reading the entire text. Such rapid assessment is not en-
tirely based on intrinsic plausibility, but does constitute a
major part. If people find that a work represents a school
of thought they reject or has a style of research they think
worthless, they become discouraged from continuing to
read the work. Although people do not always reject what
they see as being in conflict with their prior beliefs and
cognitive positions, they cannot avoid assessing the text’s
contents as plausible or implausible and accordingly
bestowing or withholding cognitive authority.
THE PROCESS OF ASSESSING CREDIBILITY
AND COGNITIVE AUTHORITY
Several theoretical frameworks suggest that the assess-
ment of credibility and cognitive authority needs to be
understood as a process rather than a discrete evaluative
event. Most of these frameworks and models are devel-
oped in the context of Internet use and Web searching.
Rieh’s Model of Judgment of Information Quality and
Cognitive Authority was proposed based on an empirical
study conducted in the context of Web searching.[11] Her
model captures the point at which people make predictive
judgments about which Web site contains credible infor-
mation and then follows through to include evaluative
judgments by which they express preferences for informa-
tion encountered. When people open a Web browser, they
take the first action based on a predictive judgment that
must be made before a new page is introduced. The selec-
tion of a certain Web site is based on people’s knowledge
and experience, recommendations from others, or other
characteristics of information objects or sources. Once
people open a new Web page, they make an evaluative
judgment in terms of how good the information is, how
useful the information is, how trustworthy the information
is, how accurate the information is, and so on. The rea-
sons underlying such judgments are based on certain
characteristics of information objects and sources. If peo-
ple find that evaluative judgments of the information do
not match the expectations of the earlier predictive judg-
ments, they might return to a previous page or decide to
start with a new page. By iterating the process, people can
reach a point at which their predictive judgments and
evaluative judgments match and they will proceed to use
that information.[21]
Wathen and Burkell’s model of credibility assessment,
developed by synthesizing the literature in the field, also
proposes that the assessment of credibility of online infor-
mation is iterative.[22] Upon entering a Web site on the
first level of evaluation, people rate the credibility of the
medium in question based on surface characteristics such
as appearance, interface design, download speed, interac-
tivity, and organization of information. Once the site
passes people’s credibility criteria in the initial evalua-
tion, they then move to the next level of evaluation.
Should the site fail the first evaluation, people are likely
to leave the site to seek others. On the second level of
evaluation, people consider the credibility of the source
and the message, evaluating source expertise, compe-
tence, trustworthiness, and credentials. The message is
evaluated in terms of content, relevance, currency, accu-
racy, and tailoring. On the third level of the evaluative
process, the interaction of message presentation and con-
tent can be assessed with respect to people’s cognitive
states. Wathen and Burkell point out that, given the limit-
less number of possible interactions among contextual
and intervening variables, credibility assessment becomes
quite complex and difficult to predict.
Fogg’s Prominence-Interpretation Theory grew out of a
series of research projects conducted at the Stanford Web
Credibility Research Lab.[23] Fogg’s theory describes the
credibility assessment process from the point at which
people notice something of interest in a Web site to the
point at which they make their judgment. This theory
states that two events need to occur for people to make
credibility assessments on the Web: they notice element(s)
in a Web site (prominence), and make judgments about
what has been noticed (interpretation). If people do not
notice the element, it would not have any impact on their
credibility assessment of the site. Fogg’s theory proposed
five factors affecting prominence: involvement (motiva-
tion and ability to scrutinize Web site content), topic of
the Web site, task of the user, experience of the user, and
individual differences in users. Interpretation, the theory’s
second component, involves people’s judgments about a
Web site element in terms of being good or bad. Various
factors relate to interpretation, including assumptions (cul-
ture, past experiences, heuristics, etc.), skills/knowledge
(level of competency in the site’s subject matter), and con-
text (environment, expectations, situational norms, etc.).
This process of prominence and interpretation can occur



































































more than once because new aspects of the site can be
continually noted and interpreted in the process of making
credibility assessments on the Web.
A number of credibility researchers have observed that
people do not always engage fully in the cognitive effort
of making analytical judgments of content messages and
sources. Rather, people often rely on mental shortcuts to
judgmental rules (or heuristics), which have evolved as
generalizations in their knowledge base and have thus
been refined through the course of their experience.[24]
People are often unaware of the role of heuristics in influ-
encing their judgments, which can result in their accept-
ing a message as credible without first attributing the
specific reasons for their acceptance. Cues that trigger
heuristics can either be embedded in a message or inter-
nally located within people’s cognition.[25]
Sundar’s research team at the Media Effects Research
Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University identified
four broad affordances in digital media capable of cueing
cognitive heuristics pertinent to making credibility assess-
ments: modality (M), agency (A), interactivity (I), and
navigability (N).[26] The modality affordance, which often
appears in the multimedia in digital devices, is the most
structural (that is, tied to structure rather than to content)
and apparent on an interface and accordingly triggers
heuristics related to realism, novelty, and coolness,
among factors. The agency affordance relates to identifi-
cation of the source. Depending on who or what is per-
ceived as a source, cognitive heuristics are triggered
and in turn affect the information’s perceived credibility.
The interactivity affordance of digital media provides
cues related to interaction, activity, choice, control, and
responsiveness. Finally, the navigability affordance has
dual abilities: hyperlinks on a Web site may trigger heur-
istics given that easily navigable sites have perceived
credibility, and words on the hyperlink trigger different
heuristics more closely related to the nature of the con-
tent. These four affordances are all structural features that
help explain the perceived credibility of digital media
beyond content characteristics. The affordances are asso-
ciated with first impressions of surface-level characteris-
tics of Web sites, which are capable of amplifying or
diminishing content effects on credibility. The core idea
of Sundar’s model is that, while cues and heuristics do not
guarantee success, they likely appeal to many individuals
striving to cope with the deluge of information.
Hilligoss and Rieh’s credibility framework also con-
siders heuristics as an important component of credibility
assessment.[27] The results of an empirical study about
people’s credibility assessment in a variety of everyday
life information-seeking contexts identified three distinct
levels of credibility judgments: construct, heuristics, and
interaction. The construct level involves defining the no-
tion of credibility that influences people’s judgments. The
heuristics level pertains to general rules of thumb for
credibility assessment, applicable to a variety of general
information seeking situations. The interaction level
refers to credibility judgments in which particular sources
or content cues are characterized. These three levels
of credibility assessment are interlinked; for instance,
people’s constructions of credibility influence the kind of
heuristics used in selecting a Web site in which people
begin a search. Credibility heuristics can influence the
ways in which people pay attention to certain character-
istics of information and sources. As people gain more
experience with a certain source of information, credibil-
ity heuristics can be changed or extended. Should a heu-
ristic prove consistent over time, then it becomes a
construct of credibility in people’s minds. Their model
additionally demonstrates that context is a factor impor-
tantly influencing all three levels of credibility assess-
ment. The context is the social, relational, and dynamic
frames surrounding people’s information-seeking pro-
cesses, creating boundaries around the information-
seeking activity or the credibility judgment itself. The
context of credibility judgments can either guide the
selection of resources or limit judgment applicability.
CONCLUSION
This entry intends to raise awareness about notions of
information credibility and cognitive authority in the field
of LIS as well as to encourage additional research work in
this area. The entry defines two concepts, introduces key
terms and dimensions, and discusses major theories and
models proposed and tested in LIS and related fields. It
also lays out the foundations of credibility and cognitive
authority in historical contexts in order to illustrate the
importance of understanding and enhancing these con-
cepts as foci of research and practice.
Assessment of credibility and cognitive authority is a
ubiquitous human activity, given that people constantly
make decisions and selections based on the value of infor-
mation in a variety of school, work, and everyday life
contexts. Further, credibility and cognitive authority as-
sessment can be seen as an ongoing and iterative process
rather than a discrete evaluation event. The judgments
made in assessment processes are highly dependent upon
people’s accumulated beliefs, existing knowledge, and
prior experiences. While information objects, sources, and
media often provide clues and bases for assessment, it is
eventually people who make assessment with respect to
their information seeking goals and motivations.
Credibility and cognitive authority have long been sig-
nificant concepts for both researchers and practitioners in
LIS and communication fields. Theoretical developments
and applications are still emerging and evolving given
changing information and communication technology
environments. Previous credibility research has looked at
people as information consumers while holding rather
narrow views of information activities, for example, by




























































focusing on seeking, reading, receiving, and watching.
Today, more people are engaging in a broad range of
information activities, such as creating and mediating
content while actively utilizing new and diverse informa-
tion technology tools and applications. Further empirical
studies need to be conducted to investigate new kinds of
research problems that reflect dynamic and complex in-
formation seeking and use contexts. Additional broad and
multidisciplinary theoretical frameworks need to be con-
structed to represent a variety of human information beha-
viors beyond information seeking and retrieving. Creative
and insightful inquiries from researchers and practitioners
into credibility and cognitive authority in the LIS field
would lead to efficient systems and programs that will
eventually help people become more effective informa-
tion users.
REFERENCES
1. Tseng, S.; Fogg, B.J. Credibility and computing technol-
ogy. Commun. ACM 1999, 42 (5), 39–44.
2. Wilson, P. Second-Hand Knowledge: An Inquiry into Cog-
nitive Authority; Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1983.
3. Self, C.C. Credibility. In An Integrated Approach to Com-
munication Theory and Research, Salwen, M.B., Stacks,
D.W., Eds.; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.: Mahwah,
NJ, 1996; 421–441.
4. Hovland, C.I.; Janis, I.L.; Kelley, H.H. Communication
and Persuasion; Yale University Press: New Haven, CT,
1953.
5. Fogg, B.J. Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to
Change What We Think and Do; Morgan Kaufmann: San
Francisco, CA, 2003.
6. Flanagin, A.J.; Metzger, M.J. Digital media and youth:
Unparalleled opportunity and unprecedented responsibility.
In Digital Media, Youth, and Credibility; Metzger, M.J.,
Flanagin, A.J., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2008;
5–28.
7. Saracevic, T. Relevance: A review of the literature and a
framework for thinking on the notion in information sci-
ence. Part II. Adv. Librarianship 2006, 30, 3–71.
8. Vickery, B.C. Subject analysis for information retrieval. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on Scientific
Information; National Academy of Sciences: Washington,
DC, 1959; Vol. 2, 855–865.
9. Cooper, W.S. On selecting a measure of retrieval effective-
ness. Part 1: The “subjective” philosophy of evaluation.
J. Am. Soc. Inform. Sci. 1973, 24 (2), 87–100.
10. Maglaughlin, K.L.; Sonnenwald, D.H. User perspectives
on relevance criteria: A comparison among relevant, par-
tially relevant, and not-relevant judgments. J. Am. Soc.
Inform. Sci. Technol. 2002, 53 (5), 327–342.
11. Rieh, S.Y. Judgment of information quality and cognitive
authority in the Web. J. Am. Soc. Inform. Sci. Technol.
2002, 53 (2), 145–161.
12. Rieh, S.Y.; Hilligoss, B. College students’ credibility
judgments in the information seeking process. In Digital
Media, Youth, and Credibility; Metzger, M.J., Flanagin, A.
J., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2008; 49–72.
13. O’Keefe, D.J. Persuasion: Theory and Research; Sage
Publications: Newbury Park, CA, 1990.
14. Metzger, M.J.; Flanagin, A.J.; Eyal, K.; Lemus, D.R.;
McCann, R.M. Credibility for the 21st century: Integrating
perspectives on source, message, and media credibility in
the contemporary media environment. In Communication
Yearbook, Kalbfleisch, P.J., Ed.; Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.: Mahwah, NJ, 2003; Vol. 27, 293–335.
15. Wilson, E.J.; Sherrell, D.L. Source effects in communica-
tion and persuasion research: A meta-analysis of effect
size. J. Acad. Market. Sci. 1993, 21 (2), 101–112.
16. Petty, R.E.; Cacioppo, J.T. The Elaboration Likelihood
Model of persuasion. In Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, Berkowitz, L., Ed.; Academic Press: New
York, 1986; Vol. 19, 123–205.
17. Roper, B. Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other
Media in a Time of Change; Television Information Office:
New York, 1985.
18. Danielson, D.R. Web credibility. In Encyclopedia of
Human-Computer Interaction; Ghaoui, C., Ed.; Idea
Group, Inc.: Hershey, PA, 2005; 713–721.
19. De George, R.T. The Nature and Limits of Authority; Uni-
versity Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1985.
20. Taylor, R.S. Question negotiation and information seeking
in libraries. Coll. Res. Libr. 1968, 29, 178–194.
21. Rieh, S.Y.; Belkin, N.J. Interaction on the Web: Scholars’
judgment of information quality and cognitive authority. In
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the American
Society for Information Science; Chicago, IL, November
13–16, 2000; Kraft, D.H., Ed.; Information Today:
Medford, NJ, 2000; Vol. 37, 25–38.
22. Wathen, C.N.; Burkell, J. Believe it or not: Factors influen-
cing credibility on the Web. J. Am. Soc. Inform. Sci.
Technol. 2002, 53 (2), 134–144.
23. Fogg, B.J. Prominence-interpretation theory: Explaining
how people assess credibility online. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Sys-
tems, Fort Lauderdale, FL, April 5–10, 2003; Cockton, G.,
Korhonen, P., Eds.; ACM: New York, 2003; 722–723.
24. Chaiken, S. Heuristic versus systematic information pro-
cessing and the use of source versus message cues in per-
suasion. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1980, 39 (5), 752–766.
25. Chen, S.; Chaiken, S. The heuristic-systematic model in its
broader context. In Dual-Process Theories in Social Psy-
chology; Chaiken, S., Trope, Y., Eds.; Guilford Press: New
York, 1999; 73–96.
26. Sundar, S.S. The MAIN Model: A heuristic approach to
understanding technology effects on credibility. In Digital
Media, Youth, and Credibility; Metzger, M.J., Flanagin,
A.J., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2008; 73–100.
27. Hilligoss, B.; Rieh, S.Y. Developing a unifying framework
of credibility assessment: Concept, heuristics, and interac-
tion in context. Inform. Process. Manag. 2008, 44 (4),
1467–1484.




































































1. Fogg, B.J. Persuasive technology: Using Computers to
Change What We Think and Do; Morgan Kaufmann: San
Francisco, CA, 2003.
2. Metzger, M.J.; Flanagin, A.J., Eds. Digital Media, Youth,
and Credibility; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2008.
3. Metzger, M.J.; Flanagin, A.J.; Eyal, K.; Lemus, D.R.;
McCann, R.M. Credibility for the 21st century: Integrating
perspectives on source, message, and media credibility in
the contemporary media environment. In Communication
Yearbook; Kalbfleisch, P.J., Ed.; Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.: Mahwah, NJ, 2003; Vol. 27, 293–335.
4. Rieh, S.Y.; Danielson, D.R. Credibility: A multidisciplin-
ary framework. In Annual Review of Information Science
and Technology, Cronin, B., Ed.; Information Today: Med-
ford, NJ, 2007; Vol. 41, 307–364.
5. Wilson, P. Second-Hand Knowledge: An Inquiry into Cog-
nitive Authority; Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1983.
1344 Credibility and Cognitive Authority of Information
C
ontrolled
–C
urating
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
R
i
e
h
,
 
S
o
o
 
Y
o
u
n
g
]
 
A
t
:
 
2
0
:
2
8
 
5
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
0
1
0
